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Abstract
Cybersecurity Incident Response (IR) teams mitigate the impact of adverse cyber-related events in
organisations. Field studies of IR teams suggest that at present the process of IR is underdeveloped with
a focus on the technological dimension with little consideration of practice capability. To improve IR
capabilities, we develop a scenario-based training approach to assist organisations to overcome sociotechnical barriers to IR. The training approach is informed by a comprehensive list of socio-technical
barriers compiled from a review of the literature. Our primary contribution is a novel meta-level
framework to generate scenarios specifically targeting socio-technical issues. As a first step towards
demonstrating the utility of the framework, a proof-of-concept scenario is presented.
Keywords cybersecurity, incident response, SETA, training, scenarios
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1 Introduction
The threat landscape is rapidly evolving and as technologies advance, attackers find new ways to
penetrate organisations’ digital defences in the hopes of obtaining information or sabotaging their IT
infrastructures (Ahmad et al. 2019). Much research exists into how cyber-attacks can be prevented
through digital fortifications (e.g., firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and anti-malware software),
but less research studies how organisations engage in incident response (IR) - the practices conducted
to address breaches to the digital fortifications. Computer security IR teams are at the forefront when
digital defences fail and must step in to mitigate the damage and restore services (Cichonski et al. 2012).
At present, the ability of IR teams to respond to cyber-attacks is being hampered by a broad range of
socio-technical issues (Ahmad et al. 2020; Nyre-Yu et al. 2019).
In this paper, we argue that IR is, at its core, a team activity. Further, that key challenges facing incident
responders are the high level of complexity and dynamism in the diverse scenarios of cyber-attack
environment and the socio-technical barriers to agility (Nyre-Yu et al. 2019). To address these
challenges, we propose to use scenarios in the context of training towards improving IR agility as they
can improve team performance in cybersecurity through building skills and identifying potential
weaknesses (Brilingaitė et al. 2020; Cichonski et al. 2012; Steinke et al. 2015). We, therefore, propose
the following research question: “How can scenarios be developed to improve cyber incident response
in organisations?”
Predominantly, research on developing scenarios comes from scenario planning, where scenarios are
used to aid decision-makers in dealing with uncertainty (Varum and Melo 2010), but scenario-based
training (SBT) also frequently appears in the literature. In the former, scenarios are described as “a
product that describes some possible future state and/or that tells the story about how such a state might
come about” (Bishop et al. 2007, p. 8) and in the latter, scenarios are used as training tools to test
participants (Noori et al. 2017). In comparison to scenario planning, SBT is a much less formalised
process. It goes beyond exploring possible versions of the future and instead uses the scenario itself as
a training tool to develop and test participants' responses to the situation unfolding (Moats et al. 2008).
SBT is already evident in cybersecurity and IR, where scenarios feature heavily in best practice training
guides (Guerber et al. 2010; Kick 2014). However (and not unlike scenario planning) they rarely offer
much in terms of how to develop a scenario and are instead more concerned with how the training
exercise is executed. By demonstrating a process for creating such scenarios, it provides organisations
with guidance on how to customise scenarios for their own unique threat landscape, thus resulting in
more effective training.
To answer the research question, this research develops scenarios that can improve IR capabilities by
focusing on the socio-technical issues being faced by organisations. To this end, training aspects of two
Event-Based Approach to Training methodologies (Nguyen et al. 2016; Oser et al. 1999) have been
combined with the unique cybersecurity scenario design methodology of Guerber et al. (2010). The
resulting scenarios (and training programs) will draw on the SBT foundation of using scenarios to help
organisations improve their reaction to a situation by training and testing participants’ responses to it.

2 Literature Review
Although the importance of IR in organisations is widely acknowledged in the literature, the discourse
is largely technology-centric (Ahmad et al. 2021a). Comparatively less attention is given to sociotechnical perspectives of how IR is managed in real-world practice. We abstracted the issues in the
literature impacting organisational IR and grouped them by people, process, and technology.

2.1 Challenges To Address with Training
Technology plays the role of both a barrier and an enabler to IR. As sophisticated attackers find new
ways to penetrate organisations’ digital defences, the cybersecurity community responds by developing
new tools to detect and thwart them. There is a need for better tools in IR as existing tools are highly
useful but suffer from a high false positive rate and lack of usability (Tøndel et al. 2014). Issues also arise
in integrating output from multiple monitoring tools to create a bigger picture. These findings were
backed by Ahmad et al. (2021a) and Kotsias et al. (2022) who labelled this “poor visibility” as a key
challenge and further identified a lack of optics in non-IT domains, such as HR.
Organisational processes impact both technology and people, and vice versa. Nyre-Yu et al. (2019, p.
438) note that the issues affecting IR are “more than just a set of usability issues in software, or of
technology development and deployment” and instead span multiple levels of an organisational
hierarchy, with each interconnected. They found that capability was constrained by whether security
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was identified as a priority in the organisational mission. If not, it was seen as a competition for
operational uptime and restricted growth and resources available to IR teams. Ahmad et al. (2021a) and
Kotsias et al. (2022) concur and report on IR being further constrained by its positioning in IT support
operations (and thus seen as a cost-centre). Similarly, Tøndel et al. (2014, p. 53) report information
security (InfoSec) being “viewed merely as a technical issue”. This view leads to a technology-centric
focus of IR, concerned more with restoring IT services than any bigger picture at play (Ahmad et al.
2020; Ahmad et al. 2021a).
The structure of the IR team can further constrain capabilities. IR teams in Security Operations Centres
are often segregated into “tiers” with members grouped together according to experience (Kotsias et al.
2022). This restricts the expertise available to each tier and hinders information sharing between
analysts (Nyre-Yu et al. 2019) and leads to a culture that erodes collaboration among team members,
favouring individual achievement over teamwork (Ahmad et al. 2021a). Furthermore, incidents are
often escalated up the chain and sometimes out of the team altogether, limiting the authority of the IR
team (Nyre-Yu et al. 2019). Relationships between team units can also impact IR capability. InfoSec
management teams also appear alongside IR in large organisations. Kotsias et al. (2022) argue that these
teams are often disconnected and have weak process-level integration, which leads to a fragmented
approach to incidents. This is manifested in a lack of communication, collaboration, and knowledge
sharing, which degrades IR capabilities and extends to other business units inside the organisation,
which cumulatively can result in a “strategic-level disconnect”.
From a people perspective, closely linked to the integration of teams and processes surrounding the
handling of incidents, is the ability of teams to collaborate and communicate effectively. Knowledge or
information sharing was a frequent issue impacting IR capabilities reported in the literature. The Ahmad
et al. (2021b) case study and Kotsias et al. (2022) clinical study are unique as they label the subject
organisation as exhibiting “exemplar” practices. The key reason is its ability to effectively share
knowledge across its security team and wider to other IT and business units. This is not the case reflected
by Nyre-Yu et al. (2019), who cite information sharing as key to developing a shared awareness of
incidents across IR teams, IT, and the wider organisation. Tøndel et al. (2014) and Ahmad et al. (2021a)
also cite issues with information sharing, with personnel unsure of what they should report and whom
they should report it to; and a lack of formal policies on what should be shared and which
communication channels to use. A poor organisational culture of mistrust between teams and fear of
over-reporting incidents for who would be held responsible were also acknowledged as fuelling poor
communication and collaboration (Tøndel et al. 2014). Outsourcing of services created further barriers
with suppliers often excluded in many phases of IR, or unwilling to take responsibility (Tøndel et al.
2014).
Training and formal policies for effective communication and knowledge sharing are cited as ways to
overcome the barriers outlined above, but they were rare in practice (Tøndel et al. 2014). Furthermore,
individual awareness of InfoSec was an issue, as training tended to focus on technical staff, not all
employees — this becomes an issue in IR as people (and their resulting notifications) were relied on
heavily in the literature in the detection of incidents (Tøndel et al. 2014). In addition, more training was
required for skills beyond that of the technical nature, as they were crucial in cybersecurity (Van der
Kleij et al. 2017). The identified issues outlined above are seen in the available literature as the major
challenges to IR capabilities (summarised in Table 1). It is however important to note these issues are
constrained to what is presented in the research on IR, and often it is not from exemplar organisations.
Furthermore, as highlighted by Tøndel et al. (2014), the data collection methods vary widely and the
absence of an identified practice does not necessarily mean it is not performed, only undocumented.

2.2 Scenario-based Training for Incident Response
SBT is a term that is at times well-defined but also more loosely applied to any form of training using a
scenario as the curriculum (Oser et al. 1999). SBT uses the scenario itself as a training tool to develop
and test participants' responses to the situation unfolding (Moats et al. 2008). Methodologically, SBT
includes a scenario design phase, the delivery of the training session and debriefing afterwards (Moats
et al. 2008). A critical aspect is to start by identifying learning objectives for the training event that are
observable and measurable for later stages (Cannon-Bowers 2008). One approach is the Event-Based
Approach to Training (EBAT), which takes the process further and systematically introduces exercise
events that map to these learning objectives, as well as participant feedback (Fowlkes et al. 1998; Nguyen
et al. 2016). These linkages allow training participants to demonstrate any learning objective
proficiencies (or deficiencies) and allow facilitators to measure their performance and provide future
learning opportunities through feedback (Fowlkes et al. 1998).
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SBT is relevant to the research question in several ways. First, the exercise is largely driven by the
identified learning objectives set at the beginning, which are then mapped to trigger events in the
scenario. This provides an opportunity to “set the scene” with the issues identified from the literature.
Second, the methodology allows for organisational learning in the latter stages when participants’
performance is measured, and feedback is offered to improve overall performance. This speaks to the
research goal of improving organisational IR. Third, both SBT and EBAT are widely used to develop and
test team performance (Fowlkes et al. 1998; Oser et al. 1999). The Literature identified teamwork as a
critical factor in successful IR team operation. And last, SBT is primarily focused on training, that is,
how the scenario can help organisations improve their reaction to a situation by training and testing
participants’ responses to it (Cannon-Bowers 2008; Moats et al. 2008). This is a critical component of
this paper’s aim - improving organisational IR through scenario development.
Socio-technical Barrier
Technology complexity
Poor field of vision in IR teams
Lack of appropriate tools
Organisational positioning within IT
limits IR capabilities
Segregated nature of the IR team
Weak process-level integration between
teams
Poor fit between process and incident
Lack of documentation when reporting,
handling, and following up incidents
Inadequate intra-team and inter-team
collaboration and communication
Insufficient training and development of
information security awareness
Lack of focus on developing soft skills
Lack of technical expertise in IR teams

Representative Citations
Ahmad et al. (2021a), Brown et al. (2016), Tøndel et al.
(2014), Van der Kleij et al. (2017)
Ahmad et al. (2021a), Brown et al. (2016), Tøndel et al.
(2014)
Ahmad et al. (2021a), Brown et al. (2016), Tøndel et al.
(2014), Van der Kleij et al. (2017)
Ahmad et al. (2020), Nyre-Yu et al. (2019), Tøndel et al.
(2014)
Ahmad et al. (2021a), Nyre-Yu et al. (2019)
Ahmad et al. (2021a), Nyre-Yu et al. (2019)
Ahmad et al. (2020), Nyre-Yu et al. (2019), Tøndel et al.
(2014), Van der Kleij et al. (2017)
Ahmad et al. (2015), Bartnes et al. (2016), Nyre-Yu et al.
(2019), Tøndel et al. (2014), Van der Kleij et al. (2017)
Ahmad et al. (2020), Bartnes et al. (2016), Grispos et al.
(2015), Hove et al. (2014), Nyre-Yu et al. (2019), Van der
Kleij et al. (2017)
Bartnes et al. (2016), Grispos et al. (2015), Hove et al.
(2014), Tøndel et al. (2014), Van der Kleij et al. (2017)
Steinke et al. (2015), Van der Kleij et al. (2017)
Ahmad et al. (2021a), Nyre-Yu et al. (2019), Tøndel et al.
(2014)

Table 1. Socio-technical Barriers identified in the literature review
SBT is evident in cybersecurity and IR, where scenarios feature heavily in best practice training guides
(Guerber et al. 2010; Kick 2014). However, they rarely offer much in terms of how to develop a scenario,
being more concerned with how training is conducted. Guerber et al. (2010) is the exception and their
method is the most rigorous identified for developing cybersecurity scenarios. The three phases of
scenario development provide a highly detailed methodology and cumulatively is a process unlike any
other identified in this research. We, therefore, conclude that SBT, and more specifically, EBAT, are
highly applicable to this research. Further, the method proposed by Guerber et al. (2010) is useful in
developing scenarios, but in isolation, none of these approaches fulfill the research goal of developing
scenarios to address the socio-technical barriers being faced by organisational IR.

3 Methodology
We propose an adapted six-step framework (Table 2) to allow organisations to develop highly tailored
scenarios of cyber-attack, but to also improve IR capabilities by utilising these scenarios in an
encompassing training program. This research enables the development of scenarios that can improve
IR capabilities by focusing on the socio-technical issues being faced by organisations. To this end,
training aspects of two EBAT methodologies (Nguyen et al. 2016; Oser et al. 1999) have been combined
with the unique cybersecurity scenario design methodology of Guerber et al. (2010). In doing so, the
resulting scenarios (and encompassing training programs) draw on the SBT foundation of using
scenarios to help organisations improve their reaction to a situation by training and testing participants’
responses to it. Drawing on the deficiencies in current practice outlined above, we create a scenario
derived from the framework (see Appendix A) to help organisations improve their IR capabilities. The
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scenario is a basis for a training exercise as per the framework, but for this paper, we only focus on the
scenario creation, not the training exercise. As such, the steps directly related to the exercise will be
omitted (steps 5 and 6). Furthermore, the scenario will be created to be as generic as practical to allow
for increased utility in organisations, but at the same time will require some constraints, namely that it
is designed for organisations with large heterogeneous technology estates, spanning multiple
jurisdictions. Lastly, the scenario will be developed as a tabletop exercise (TTX), one of two common
SBT exercises in cybersecurity. A TTX was chosen as they are typically much shorter in duration than
their functional exercise counterparts and require less planning and technical resources (Kick 2014).
Table 2 outlines our proposed framework.
Scenario-development Steps
Step 1: Develop learning objectives
Step 2: Craft trigger events
Step 3: Develop scenario storyline
3.1: Determine key scenario elements
3.2: Develop backstory
3.3: Finalise storyline
Step 4: Develop event threads
4.1: Craft event synopsis
4.2: Craft events
4.3: Event thread walkthrough
Step 5: Identify targeted responses to
events and performance measures
Step 6: Operationalise learnings

Scenario-building Activities
Identify the goals of the training program
Provide opportunities for participants to demonstrate
proficiencies/deficiencies for all learning objectives
Determine scenario intent, threat, target, operational
effect, and business impact
Develop detail of threat actors, necessary intelligence
and background information
Revisit each scenario element and add in any extra
storyline details
Craft an event synopsis by outlining the chronological
event thread that will stimulate the storyline
Fill in event details from the previous step
Walkthrough to flesh out final scenario details
Identify target responses to events or measures to
observe performance for evaluation and feedback
Put learnings from exercise into practice to improve IR

Table 2: Scenario Development Framework

4 Discussion
The following sub-sections explore each of the steps outlined above in more detail and provide
an understanding for practitioners developing SBT programs on how to implement the steps
for their own context.

4.1 Develop learning objectives
Step1: As this example focuses on the creation of a scenario, and not the encompassing training exercise,
the issues identified from the literature review (Table 1) are used in place of learning objectives. The
identification of these issues is the cornerstone of this research and by explicitly linking them to trigger
events, the scenario created will exploit any deficiencies in these areas. These issues would have been
turned into learning objectives if the full training framework was being followed.

4.2 Craft trigger events
Step2: We map learning objectives (or IR issues), as described in Section 2.2, to trigger events to be used
in the scenario. Trigger events were identified for each issue, by drawing on the literature and our
knowledge of real-world cyber incidents, which was used to link the trigger events and issues to allow
the resulting scenario to expose any weaknesses that may exist in these areas. Table 3 shows the outcome
of this process, with the learning objectives or issues identified in section 2 listed in the left-hand
column, along with the trigger events created in this step listed in the right-hand column. The list of
trigger events is not exhaustive but is a useful starting point in crafting training scenarios that address
deficiencies in “best practice” IR.

4.3 Develop scenario storyline
Step 3: Adapted from the cybersecurity training methodology proposed by Guerber et al. (2010), this
step has three sub-phases: determine key scenario elements; develop backstory; and finalise storyline.
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4.3.1 Determine key scenario elements
In Step 3.1, the key scenario elements of scenario intent, threat, target, and operational effect are
determined. A fifth key element, “business impact”, is introduced which is purposely excluded by
Guerber et al. (2010) but is relevant here as the context for the scenario is cybersecurity in organisations.
The scenario intent is described by Guerber et al. (2010) as the overall objective of the scenario. For this
research, the scenario intent is twofold: to develop a scenario that exploits the issues impacting IR
capabilities; and to use such a scenario in a training exercise to help organisations to improve their IR
capabilities (although this paper does not cover this).
IR Issue
Technology complexity
Poor field of vision
Lack of appropriate tools

Organisational positioning in
IT operations
Segregated nature of the IR
team
Weak process-level
integration between teams
Poor fit between process and
incident
Lack of documentation when
reporting, handling, and
following up incidents
Poor intra- and inter-team
collaboration and comms
Insufficient training and
development of security
awareness

Lack of focus in developing
soft skills
Lack of technical expertise

Trigger Event
A. attack affects a high number of diverse devices
B. attackers employ a high volume of known attacks
C. contradictory notifications of attack among IR tools
D. multipronged attack whereby later attacks offer cover for
earlier ones, deleting logs/evidence
E. attacks part of infrastructure where the IR team does not
have full optics because of inappropriate tools
F. attack has a physical aspect
G. attackers target non-IT services or assets, such as the
business side or a business asset, a physical domain, or HR
H. incident responder working in isolation and does not seek
team collaboration to thwart the attack
I. attackers employ a high volume of known attacks
J. attackers target obscure business asset
K. attackers misdirect the IR team to cause a misdiagnosis of
incident classification
L. un- or inadequately documented information becomes
relevant to the IR team
No specific trigger. Tested in other trigger events
M. attacker targets end user, who encounters a problem they
don’t perceive as a threat and logs incident through help desk
N. attackers target employee’s personal device
O. attack duration exceeds 24 hours requiring incident
responders to cope with a prolonged state of “emergency”
P. attackers target shadow IT
Q. attack puts strain on the relationship between IR and
business units by targeting business only
R. IR team required to conduct forensic evidence collection

Table 3. Mapping between IR issue and trigger events
The threat element encompasses both the actor and their method of attack. For this scenario, a highly
sophisticated and organised attacker, who belongs to an advanced persistent threat (APT) group, was
chosen over the selection of a low-skilled attacker as that would have limited the applicability of the
scenario to address the range of issues identified. As they belong to an APT group they also represent
the most formidable threat (Ahmad et al. 2019) and would use both known exploits and zero-day attacks
in a prolonged endeavour. As this scenario is a TTX and is designed to be as generic as practical to allow
for increased utility in organisations, all key scenario elements are discussed only in high-level detail.
Some constraints are needed to derive a meaningful scenario, and as such, the scenario has been created
from the perspective of a large organisation with a core research and development (R&D) function. An
R&D organisation is an example of an organisation where it not only has IT services that could be the
target of a cyber-attack, but also intellectual property (IP). In this way, the resulting scenario will
exercise as many identified deficiencies as possible. It also means we can update the threat actor to be a
nation-state threat actor or a competitor to the organisation — or more than likely, both.
Similarly, the target from a high-level perspective is the IP of the organisation, but numerous
intermediary assets and services along the way will be affected in the prolonged attack, such as shadow
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IT, servers, and other business assets. It is difficult to discuss targets in any finer detail, as the
organisation being targeted is purely hypothetical.
Operational effect and business impact are clearly separated by Guerber et al. (2010) with the former
relating to the effect on the target and organisation, concerning the CIA triad of confidentiality, integrity,
and availability. For this scenario, as the organisation’s IP is the target, the effect then becomes a total
loss of confidentiality and disruption in the availability of IT services as a secondary vector in the attack.
For business impact, Guerber et al. (2010) define it as the effect on the organisation’s ability to carry out
its mission. In this instance, the scenario has been created from the point of view of an organisation
whose primary function is R&D, and as such, the theft of its IP would be catastrophic, destroying its
competitive advantage at the least.

4.3.2 Develop backstory
Guerber et al. (2010, p. 34) describe this Step 3.2 as the general context or “state of the world” for the
scenario and it encompasses threat actor details and necessary background information on the
organisation and nation. For the context of this scenario, only high-level detail will again be provided.
The threat actor detail comprises both motives and level of expertise. As determined previously, the
threat actor belongs to an APT group and has high levels of expertise, and the attack is a nation-state
sponsored with the motive of stealing the organisation’s IP to get a financial or commercial advantage.
The necessary background information can be viewed from both inside the organisation and outside.
Internally, the scenario is presented during a time of considerable growth for the organisation, where its
R&D operation has expanded significantly and remains busy. This has resulted in the organisation
employing new staff across the board and hiring contractors to upgrade systems in a manner to ensure
minimal downtime. Externally, there is high interest in the organisation’s newest developments in R&D,
from both competitors and potential buyers. At the same time, the threat landscape is rapidly evolving,
with highly skilled attackers increasingly going undetected.

4.3.3 Finalise storyline
Step 3.3 revisits each scenario element to add storyline details including: locations of specific systems,
information or processes being targeted; the methods of discovery employed by the attacker to access a
target; and an attacker’s source location (see Guerber et al. (2010, p. 34) for more examples). Once again,
as the scenario being developed here is based on a hypothetical organisation, it is difficult to provide
such granular detail. As such, no extra information will be added to the scenario.

4.4 Develop event threads
Step 4 has also been adapted from the methodology proposed by Guerber et al. (2010) to handle TTXs.
It encompasses three sub-phases: craft event synopsis; craft events; and event thread walkthrough.
Cumulatively, the sub-phases are designed to develop event threads, which are chronological sets of
events that relate to a specific focus area of the training program.

4.4.1 Craft event synopsis
Step 4.1 crafts an event synopsis, or multiple synapses, in the case where an exercise has multiple cyber
incidents. Each event synopsis provides a chronological list of all the events that make up the cyber
incident (see Guerber et al. (2010, p. 36)). As much of this phase involves the technical detail required
of functional exercises, it is inapplicable here. But at a high level, it is still possible to use the list of trigger
events identified in Table 3 to craft event synopses for the scenario being created. The scenario will have
multiple related cyber incidents, and thus multiple synopses, to include as many of the trigger events as
practical. It is impossible, however, to incorporate all of them in one cyber incident.
To craft these event synopses, selected trigger events were clustered together to form a plausible cyber
incident. These trigger events were then arranged in the order they would expect to be seen in the
determined cyber incident. The outcome is shown in Table 4, where each event synopsis represents one
cyber incident that will be observed in the scenario.
Two or more trigger events can occur at the same time in each cyber incident, but for the purposes of
the table, they are still listed one after the other. Of the 18 trigger events identified in Table 3, all but two
have been included in the cyber incidents to keep the resulting scenario both plausible and to an
acceptable length. The two that were excluded, however, map to issues that are already represented in
the included 16 trigger events, so no issue has been left out of the resulting scenario.
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4.4.2 Craft events
Step 4.2 exists to fill in the event details from the previous step. For each event synopsis outlined in
Table 4, a storyline has been crafted to utilise the respective event triggers.

4.4.3 Event thread walkthrough
Step 4.3 is a walkthrough of the scenario to flesh out the final details. It is a team exercise and Guerber
et al. (2010) identify it as the most time-consuming phase of scenario development. Expected responses
from players are also included in this sub-phase, however, for the proposed framework, it is included in
Step 5 in keeping with the EBAT methodologies.
Trigger Event
Event synopsis 0
G. attackers target a non-IT service or asset, such
as the business side or a business asset, a
physical domain, or HR
F. attack has a physical aspect
Event synopsis 1

Story Line
•
•

P. attackers target shadow IT
N. attackers target employee’s personal device
M. attacker targets end user, who then encounters
a problem they don’t perceive as a threat and
logs incident through help desk
L. un- or inadequately documented information
becomes relevant to the IR team
R. IR team required to conduct forensic evidence
collection
Event synopsis 2

•

G. attackers target non-IT service or asset, such as
the business side or a business asset, a physical
domain, or HR
J. attackers target obscure business asset
K. attackers misdirect the IR team to cause a
misdiagnosis of incident classification
Q. attack puts strain on relationship between IR
and business units by targeting business only
R. IR team required to conduct forensic evidence
collection
Event synopsis 3

•

B. attackers employ high volume of known attacks
I. attackers employ high volume of known attacks
C. attack results in contradictory notifications
among IR tools
O. attack duration exceeds 24 hours requiring
incident responders to cope with a prolonged
state of “emergency”
Event synopsis 4

•

A. attack affects a high number of diverse devices
C. attack results in contradictory notifications
among IR tools
D. attack is multipronged, whereby later attacks
offer cover for earlier ones, deleting logs and
forensic evidence

•

•

•

•

•

•
•

a new hire at the organisation is actually
working for the attackers
attackers gain physical access to systems
being upgraded by posing as contractors
attackers compromise an R&D worker’s
personal device in the hunt for IP
R&D worker doesn’t realise as they lack
InfoSec awareness and instead log
resulting technical issues through the help
desk
IR team eventually detects the incident
but must deal with a lack of information
and processes around personal devices
attackers take the R&D server offline
(along with others) to hide the theft of IP
IR team must decide between focusing on
restoration or exploring the root cause of
the incident

attackers launch a high-volume attack
designed to confuse and fatigue incident
responders and provide cover via
misdirection/interference
IR team cannot cope with the sustained
increase in volume, and it impacts team
culture
attackers launch a large-scale attack, e.g.
distributed denial of service, to wipe out
any evidence left behind
notifications confuse incident responders
as to the motives of the attack, tools give
conflicting messages
IR team must decide between focusing on
restoration or exploring the root cause

Table 4. Event Synopsis
In the context of the scenario being developed here, the storylines have been “fleshed out” with finer
details to create a cumulative scenario of five incidents or event threads. The scenario has been presented
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as a TTX (Appendix A), consistent with best practice guidelines (Guerber et al. 2010; Kick 2014) and
examples of TTXs found online (e.g. WSOC (2014)).

5 Conclusion
Returning to the research question of “how can scenarios be developed to improve cyber incident
response in organisations?”, the first part of the research identified a comprehensive list of sociotechnical issues facing organisational IR through the literature review. The second part of the research
identified a lack of an appropriate methodology to develop scenarios to address these issues, and as
such, proposed a new framework that is rooted in the previous work of EBAT and best practice
cybersecurity guidelines. A scenario was then created from this framework, which systematically
mapped the socio-technical issues identified in the first part of the research to events in the resulting
scenario. Owing to the previous work on the utility of EBAT and SBT overall, it is argued that such a
scenario would not only enable organisations to assess their IR capabilities but also improve them by
following the extra steps to implement the encompassing training program.

5.1 Significance
This research is significant to both the practice and theory of IR. The meta-level framework developed,
the proof-of-concept scenario, the comprehensive list of socio-technical issues, and the event triggers
derived from them, all take strides to address a real-world problem. That is, organisations cannot
currently carry out effective IR as the process is technology-focused and underdeveloped. By focusing
on the socio-technical barriers we argue organisations can improve their IR capability.
This research is significant to practice as it provides organisations with a ready-made scenario to
improve IR capability and teaches them how to create their own. The framework developed and the two
“ingredients” created – the list of IR deficiencies and the event triggers derived from them – combine
into a training tool that, to the best of our knowledge, is the first of its kind in cybersecurity. It targets
the socio-technical barriers impacting IR teams, allowing organisations to assess whether they are facing
the same issues. But the framework doesn’t solely rely on these barriers — it is flexible enough to allow
organisations to choose specific deficiencies to focus on, or they can create their own learning objectives.
The encompassing training program leads to better-aligned outcomes for IR and all six areas of InfoSec
management: IR; policy; risk management; education, training, and awareness; technical management;
and intra-organisation liaison management (Alshaikh et al. 2014; Lim et al. 2012; Maynard et al. 2011).
From a theory perspective, the research addresses a literature gap with no comparable methodology
identified for organisations to develop scenarios (and resulting training programs) that target sociotechnical issues. The training framework draws on established methodologies to systematically link the
socio-technical issues with events in the resulting scenario. The comprehensive range of deficiencies we
identified consolidates the available literature on IR practice, which is at present dispersed and
disconnected. New research regarding the study of IR in practice is needed. Furthermore, IR literature
on socio-technical issues is lacking, with the focus currently mainly on technology aspects of IR.
The foundation of this research is the literature contribution. The results are influenced by not only what
was available, but also the scope of such literature and the context of the organisations studied (e.g.,
typically not exemplar organisations). Research is needed into the real-world practice of IR to remedy
this. Further, data collection methods vary widely in the literature. The absence of an identified practice
does not necessarily mean it is not performed, only undocumented (Tøndel et al. 2014).

5.2 Limitations
The project was subject to several limitations. First, the scenario was a hypothetical rather than an actual
organisation. Second, the proof of concept was focused on scenario creation rather than the training
program. The framework needs to be tested and implemented by organisations, creating not only a
scenario driven by socio-technical issues but an encompassing training program to operationalise
learnings from the scenario. The results would enable researchers to measure the effectiveness of the
framework towards improving organisational IR.
The research presents opportunities for future work. First, case study research is needed to examine the
practice of IR teams towards understanding the socio-technical challenges of organisational IR. It could
do this by both confirming or denying the presence of the issues identified in this literature review and
identifying new issues. Second, the framework could be extended for use in functional cybersecurity
exercises as well as discussion-based ones like TTXs. Last, the suggested list of event triggers could be
enhanced through greater research into past cyber-attacks, bringing more depth to the scenarios.
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7 Appendix A: Proof-of-Concept Scenario
Preamble: Your organisation has just gone through a period of considerable growth within its R&D
operations, hiring new staff across the board and employing contractors to upgrade systems both
virtually and physically. The organisation is gaining a lot of attention for its recent developments and
there is plenty of interest in the work currently being undertaken. At the same time, cyber threats are
rapidly becoming realised, with highly skilled attackers successfully penetrating well-respected
organisations and operating for quite some time undetected.
First Scenario: An R&D employee working from home on their personal laptop notices their computer
acting oddly. It is late at night, they are fatigued from a busy period at work, but they try everything they
can think of to fix this issue themselves. Eventually, they concede it is beyond their capabilities and retire
for the night. The next morning when they clock on at work, they contact the organisation’s help desk
from their employee laptop, which works just fine. Question: How would you respond?
Optional inject: Upon escalation to the IR team, it is revealed the employee was the victim of a social
engineering attack, where they clicked on an attachment in a spear phishing email to their work address.
Question: Does this new information change your earlier response? If yes, how so?
Optional inject: The IR team now requires physical access to the compromised laptop. The employee
is uncontactable, and the laptop remains at their house. Question: How would you respond?
Second Scenario: It is a long weekend; a few staff are at work when several servers stop responding.
Calls are placed to the help desk from a selection of the skeleton staff, including a business executive, an
R&D employee, and a call centre worker, frustrated as they cannot do their job while the servers are
offline. Question: How would you respond?
Optional inject: One of the server asset owners has not been contactable for three days. Question:
Does this new information change your earlier response? Explain.
Third Scenario: The IR team has noticed an increase in the volume and frequency of known, lowimpact attacks. It is unclear what the reason for the increase is. Question: How would you respond?
Optional inject: The high frequency of attacks continues beyond 24 hours and level two analysts are
assisting fatigued junior employees to manage the workload. Some staff members are beginning to
become disgruntled at the extra “trivial” work and voice their grievances, not the least of which is missing
the send-off afternoon tea for a valued staff member. Question: How would you respond?
Fourth Scenario: It is Friday afternoon – the end of the work-week when a large-scale distributed
denial of service attack hits the organisation. IT systems are crippled, including communication
channels such as email and mobile phones. Question: How would you respond? What takes first
priority?
Optional inject: Systems are restored, and services are beginning to be recovered across the
organisation. Question: What happens next?
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